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ABSTRACT
Capture and Hostility hypotheses are tested in this
thesis.

The Capture Theory states that state regulatory

commissions are "captured" by the firms they are regulating.
The Hostility theory states that elected commissions are
"hostile" to the regulated firms in the eyes of the
financial community, leading to higher prices and
restrictions in access to capital.

The capture theory

predicts higher prices to consumers under the regulatory
authority of appointed commissions.

The hostility theory

predicts lower prices to consumers under appointed
comissions.
Inflation that was prevalent in the economy twenty
years ago may have caused problems for empirical analysis.
This paper shows evidence that there was "noise" in the data
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and was somewhat
subdued in the 1990s data.

The "noise" was probably caused

by microeconomic inefficiencies that occur when unexpected
inflation affects microeconomic decision making.

The noise

in the data leads to poor economic modeling in the 1980 data
and better modeling in the 1992 data.
Economists should resume the study of commission
structure.

The issue was never fully resolved in previous

work, but is still quite important to consumers.
viii

The prices

consumers pay for electricity is heavily affected by the
political structure between the commissions and the firms
they regulate.

IX

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The electric industry is going through rapid changes.
Pricing structures for the use of transmission lines will be
regulated by the commissions but production prices will be
deregulated.

Constructs such as Independent System

Operators (ISOs) and Power Exchanges (PXs) that have been
used in California will likely be used to facilitate the
sales and distribution of electricity throughout the United
States.

ISOs are power grid managers who will facilitate

the distribution of electricity.

PXs are exchanges that

will facilitate the buying and selling of electricity.
Local communities and large corporate customers will have
the option of choosing among suppliers depending on who has
the best price and the transmission providers will charge
their regulated price for the use of the transmission lines
(Rodgers and Schuler, 1998).
ISOs and PXs allow for open access by consumers.

The

proponents of open access see a future in which customers
have a plethora of new choices for services and lower
overall prices, while other analysts see increasing prices
ahead.

Increasing prices will come in the form of stranded

cost recovery and excess capacity problems.
1

A full
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explanation of these problems is offered in Appendix B.
California began experimenting with ISOs and PXs in 1997
and promised to allow full use of them sometime in 1998
(0'Donnel, 1996) .
California's Public Service Commission has had a large
impact on the restructuring process and will continue to
have an impact in the future regarding transmission costs
(Schuler, 1996).

Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) studied

the impact of commissions on the industries they regulate
and found the commissions were captured by the firms they
were regulating.

To put it succinctly, the commissions have

the kind of impact on the industry that the firms in the
industry want them to have.

The regulatory system needs to

be studied and developed so that it does not negatively
impact consumers in order to give producers profits above an
ordinary rate of return.
Chapter two discusses the history of regulatory
commissions and develops the theories behind "capture" and
"hostility."

Chapter three tests the two theories with data

from 1980, 1992, and a pooled time series from both years.
Chapter four is the conclusion and spells out the empirical
ramifications from the model results.
Appendix A explains the econometric tests that were
done to test the data and the model. Appendix B explains
the new regulatory practices coming on the scene and why
there may still be good reasons to study the relationships
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between commission boards and the firms they regulate.
Appendix C is the list of firms, commission type, and state
location used in the study.

Appendix D is the graphs of

prices between customer classes which shows lower prices to
the larger customers.

Appendix E is the graphs of residuals

showing evidence for heteroscedasticity in the data from
1980 and lesser heteroscedasticity in the 1992 data.
The conclusions drawn in this thesis are that capture
is a problem in the industry and that macroeconomic problems
in the 1970s and 1980s caused the empirical breakdown of
econometric models.

Results from chapter three reveal that

the industry did not change much over time which means that
the heteroscedasticity was caused by the outside
macroeconomic problems experienced during that time period.
By the late 1980s, the macroeconomic problems had been
stabilized and the subject can, once again, be studied to
determine the true relationship between commissions and the
firms they are entrusted to regulate.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Three types of regulatory authorities existed in the
1800s and were beset with various problems.

Judicial

regulators had no expertise in the economic issues facing
electric companies and were localized in nature.

Municipal

regulation was subject to corruption because of the nature
of franchise competition and the way the municipal
governments awarded the franchises and was also a localized
form of regulation.

Early state regulatory agencies were

inefficient because of a lack of expertise in the economic
issues facing the electric companies caused by a lack of
funding (Simmons, 1988).

Despite all this, the early years

of regulation did not cause the industry too many problems
because the firms were small and confined to a limited
geographic area (Simmons, 1988).
As they grew in size, electric companies found
themselves favoring state regulation.

They were faced with

different sets of regulatory rules in various
municipalities.

Business decisions were complicated because

of these differing rules in various geographical areas
serviced by utilities (Simmons, 1988).

Electric companies

favored state regulations because they had fewer regulatory
4
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boards to deal with and had a more consistent set of
regulations to follow.

Electric companies also favored

the rise of state commissions because it reduced the threat
of corruption by local officials (Simmons, 1988).
From the 1930s to well into the 1960s, sizes of
electric generating plants were greatly increasing, and
prices to consumers were falling.

Through economies of

scale, increasing efficiency, and relatively flat input
prices, the real price of electricity fell during the period
(Simmons, 1988).
With the late 1960s came an escalation of prices for
inputs due to unexpected increases in inflation (Studness,
1990).

Real electric prices, which started out declining by

more than 3.5% per year in the early 1960s, now declined
only .7% by 1970 (Studness, 1990).

With prices declining

for so many decades prior to the 1970s, there was little
pressure on regulators to keep rate increases down (Hyman,
1988) .
The 1970s brought severe inflation and electric
utilities began to file for rate increases more often
(Studness, 1990).

This meant an increased role for the

state utility commissions in controlling electricity prices.
Consumers were spending an increasing share of their incomes
on electric services during this time and perceived that the
utility commissions were not being responsive to the needs
of the consumer (Studness, 1990).

This increase in
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regulatory activity coupled with negative consumer attitudes
towards the electric industry brought an interest in
changing the way the industry was regulated.
Regulatory Theory
Regulatory theory went through a transformation from
capture theories in the 1970s to hostility theories by the
1980s.

Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) were instrumental

in developing capture theories which state that the firms
under regulation are capturing the regulators and
influencing the regulatory outcomes in favor of the firms
over the consumers.

The capture theories began to breakdown

in the late 1970s and early 1980s in favor of hostility
theories developed by Trout (1979) and Navarro (1982).
Capture Theory
George J. Stigler addressed the question of commission
structure in his "Economic Theory of Regulation" (1971).
The central thesis of Stigler's theory is that, "As a rule,
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated for its benefit" (Stigler, 1971).

Stigler's aim

was to explain who receives the benefits and who bears
the burdens of regulatory activity by the state.
Stigler (1971) compared licensed versus unlicensed
occupations and came to four conclusions about the effect of
regulation through licensing.

In general, licensed

occupations were found to have higher incomes, and greater
longevity in the occupation.

Those in the occupations were

7

usually self-employed and regulation was usually at the
state level.

These results led Stigler to conclude that the

commissions may also have an effect on the way that
decisions are handed down.

He said, "The only way to get a

different commission would be to change the political
support for the commission, and reward commissioners on a
basis unrelated to their services to the carriers."

Stigler

indicated that the way to change commission behavior was to
change the way that the commissioners are selected, but he
did not suggest how to accomplish this change in commission
structure (Stigler, 1971).
Peltzman (1976) extended Stigler's work by suggesting
that the regulators are captured by the very organizations
they are regulating and that commission structure should
be changed.

Peltzman's work suggested that the rivalry

among interest groups led to the squaring-off of the
politicians, regulators and utilities against the consumers.
Consumers would lose this battle because of a lack of
political clout.

Peltzman pointedly suggested that

commissioners should be publicly elected thereby mitigating
the power of the utility to affect the outcome of rate cases
(Peltzman, 1976) .
An empirical test of the capture theory conducted by
Crain and McCormick (1978) asserted the existence of wealth
maximization effects by the regulatory agency.

For a

regulatory commissioner, wealth maximization may come in the
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form of bribes and conflicts of interest.

Regulators expect

to receive jobs with the utilities they regulate if they
have made decisions that increase the wealth of the
regulated utility.

Under this theory of wealth maximizing

behavior, the appointed regulator is predicted to have more
to gain by catering to the firm rather than consumers
(Crain-McCormick, 1978).
Crain and McCormick (1978) found that elected
regulators seemed to provide lower prices to the consumer
than did appointed regulators.

They found that the direct

election of regulators caused price to be lower by an
average of 12%.

The Crain-McCormick results could not be

reproduced in later studies.
A study done by Mann-Primeaux (1983) using data from
1973 and 1979, found weak evidence that elected regulators
hold prices lower than appointed regulators.

Some of the

factors attributed were a lack of flexibility in rate
setting, election decreases public interest because the
public assumes an elected commission will automatically look
after their best interests.
Lastly, Barvick (1983) found that utilities in every
state tend to influence outcomes of rate hearings as much as
possible by sending representatives to plead their case with
the regulators.

The firms know firsthand which regulators

exercise judgements in their favor and would reward them
based on what he called the "Revolving Door Technique."
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Regulators are assured of a good job in the private sector
if they produce results favorable to the utility as they
serve their term on the public utility commission (Barvick,
1983) .
Hostility Theory
In a study done by Robert Trout (1979), strong evidence
was uncovered that suggested that elected commissions were
developing rate policies that were considered "hostile"
toward regulated utilities.

Rate policies were "hostile"

because of the effect they had on the ability of the firm to
issue bonds at reasonable interest rates.

Trout quoted

Jeffrey S. Stein, a securities analyst from McDonald & Co.,
who said "When you buy securities of a utility, you are
buying the public utilities commission"

(Trout, 1979).

Securities analysts drive bond ratings, therefore negative
attitudes by analysts with respect to elected commissions
will tend to lower bond ratings.

Trout (1979) found the

difference in the cost of capital between favorable
regulation states and unfavorable states was 1.97 percentage
points in the cost of debt capital.
Navarro (1982) discovered specific regulatory actions
that lowered bond ratings given by the financial community.
Elected commissions did not generally allow accounting
methods that maintain cash flow.

The accounting methods

that were considered negative in the eyes of the financial
community are not allowing construction in progress to
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become part of the rate base, maximizing regulatory lag,
normalizing tax credits and not allowing for automatic fuel
adjustment clauses.

With the above information in mind, it

stands to reason that the investment community will give
poorer bond ratings to utilities that are regulated by
commissions that have the appearance of "hostility" towards
regulated utilities.
In a study done by Dubin and Navarro (1983), the
market-to-book ratio was found to be quite different between
electric utilities under elected Public Utility Commission
regimes and appointed regimes.

Market-to-book ratios under

elected commissions, were 8 points lower and the cost of
equity capital was 228 basis points higher (Dubin and
Navarro, 1983).

With such a large increase in the cost of

equity capital, the price should be affected by decreases
in stock valuations and an overall tightening of the
availability of capital in the equity markets in comparison
to firms with more favorable market-to-book ratios (Dubin
and Navarro, 1983) .
Costello (1984) was very puzzled by the finding that
costs of capital are higher to utilities under elected
commission regimes.

This finding would suggest that the

price of electricity under elected commissions should show
some tendency to increase rather than decrease when compared
with appointed commissions.
theory prior to 1979.

This was contradictory to most

Most pre-1979 theory posited a

11

tendency for the price under election of commissions to be
lower.

Costello's results from 1980 data showed no evidence

for either the capture or hostility theories.
The Regulatory Model
In a paper published in the Yale Journal of Regulation
(1984) , Kenneth Costello tested three models of regulatory
behavior.

First was the Crain-McCormick model mentioned

above, for which the results were positive for the
minimizing affect on price of the elected commission.
Costello's second test was based on a model from Thomas M.
Pelsoci (1979).

Pelsoci's conclusion was that regulatory

commissions should not be elected unless their organizations
could match the resources of the utilities they were
regulating.

Pelsoci went on to say that the future studies

of commission reform should take into account more variables
that impact rate decisions, especially in the area of the
political environment.

The third model tested by Costello

was the Mann-Primeaux study from 1982.

The Mann-Primeaux

study found no empirical evidence that electing regulators
had any advantage over the appointment of regulators.
Mann-Primeaux, as in the Pelsoci article, suggested adding
more variables to the model to add to the sophistication
and realism of the results.
All the models investigated by Costello follow the
basic theory of regulation which holds that the price the
regulated utility is allowed to charge is a function not
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only of the supply and demand, but also the regulation of
the utility firm.

The cost determinants are composed of

four input cost variables.

The form and nature of

regulation comprises the fifth variable of the model
(Costello, 1984).
Costello's re-estimations of the three studies found no
definitive evidence for the theory that prices are lower
under elected commissions than under appointed commissions.
Of the three studies re-estimated by Costello, the
Mann-Primeaux study (Mann and Primeaux, 1983) will be
reproduced in this thesis.

This study used the most direct

approach and had the same conclusion as the other two
studies in Costello's re-estimation of the models.
The Mann-Primeaux model is specified as:
Pi=f(SS,DC,TX,PC,COMM)
Pi = average revenue per kilowatt hour;
SS = net electric utility plant;
DC = total distribution expenses per kilowatt hour;
TX = total tax payments per kilowatt hour sales;
PC = total production expenses per kilowatt hour sales;
COMM = dummy variable representing the type of
commission selection (1 = appointed, 0 =
elected).
The dependent variable (Pi) is divided into three
regimes.

The first is residential, representing small

residential customers.

The second is commercial,
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representing medium size customers such as small businesses,
retail outlets, etc.

The third type is large industrial

users such as manufacturing plants, shopping malls, etc.
Costello reported results for residential customers only,
stating that the results were similar for all the customer
classes (Costello, 1984).
The independent variables, originally used by
Mann-Primeaux (1983), were incorporated to show the effect
of inputs and regulation on the price of electricity.

The

(SS) variable is a measure of system scale and is assumed to
have an inverse relationship to price.

As the size of the

plant gets larger, the price charged by the utility should
get smaller, through economies of scale.

The (DC) variable

is related to the cost of distribution and is expected to
have a positive relationship to price.

As distribution

costs increase, the costs of the final output should
increase as well.

The (TX) variable represents taxes.

With

relatively inelastic demand for electricity, the utility
will pass the burden of taxes on to the customers and these
should have a positive relationship to price.

The (PC)

variable reflects the production cost of electricity through
measures of efficiency related to fuel utilization and
generating facilities.

The (PC) variable is expected to

have a positive relationship to price (Costello, 1984).
The various types of regulatory commissions are
represented by a "dummy" variable with 1 = appointed
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commissions and 0 = elected commissions.

There are two

possible results obtainable with the dummy variable.

The

expected result from the capture model is that appointed
commissions will exhibit a positive sign on the dummy
variable due to the assertion that appointed commissions are
captured by the firms they are regulating.

Under the

capture hypothesis, appointed commissions will allow price
hikes more often to the firms than their elected
counterparts.

The expected result from the hostility model

is that elected commissions cause bond rating problems for
the regulated firms.

Bond rating problems push costs of

capital higher and utility

prices must rise with the

increased cost of capital.

The hostility model has an

expected negative sign on the dummy variable.

The sign is

negative due to the price rising less under appointed
commissions than under elected commissions.
Table 1 shows Costello's results obtained from his re
estimation of the Mann-Primeaux model.

Costello (1984) gave

results for the residential regression only, so only one
data table is represented here.
The t-statistic for the net electric plant variable
(SS) was found to have no significant effect on price (PI).
The electric plants studied may be into the lowest part of
long run average costs, which would account for the minute
coefficients and insignificant t-statistics.
The t-statistics for distribution expenses (DC), total
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tax payments (TX), and production expenses (PC) were all in
TABLE 1
RESIDENTIAL PRICES
(COSTELLO'S REGRESSION)
Variable

Coefficients
2.11
-0.025
2.53
2.31
0.869
-0.052

C
SS
DC
TX
PC
COMM
R Squared
With COMM
Without COMM
F Value
N
Note:

T-Ratios

Signif

(*)
-0.69
2.14
7.76
11.08
-0.27

5%
1%
1%

0.84
0.84
80.8
82

(*) Costello did not give a point estimate in his
empirical results.

the significant range of 5% level and above, and all had the
expected signs of a positive relationship to price.
Costello found the type of commission selection to have
little affect on the price of electricity.

The t-statistic

for the COMM dummy variable was found to be insignificant.
No evidence was found for either the capture or the
hostility theories in Costello's work.
The Purpose of This Thesis
Costello found that commission structure has little
effect on price in his original study.

He hypothesized that

not enough time had elapsed to show an effect on price.

The

16

rise in rate requests in the mid and late 1970s gave the
state utility commissions a much more pro-active role in the
determination of regulated electric utility prices.

The

increased role of the elected commissions would mean that
any external effect that those commissions might have, would
be more important than in the past (Costello, 1984).
Costello stated that, given more time, the effect of
regulatory commissions should show up in the data (Costello,
1984).

Now that some time has passed, the matter should be

studied to discover whether the new data reflects what
Costello predicted, that the price of electricity is
higher with elected commissions than appointed commissions.
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is threefold.

The

first goal is to reproduce Costello's results using the
Mann-Primeaux model.

If Costello's results can be

reproduced, the model can be used to test changes in the
data and/or the industry.

The second goal is to add a new

set of data to the Mann-Primeaux model, which will test for
direction of movement that appointed commissions have on the
price of electricity.

The third goal is to test the capture

vs. hostility hypotheses.

CHAPTER III

REGRESSIONS AND ANALYSIS
Data origination, collection, and delineation are laid
out in this chapter, along with the model, regression
results, and analyses.
1980 Data
Costello deleted 100 firms from a total population of
182 electric service providers.

Firms from various states

operate under ambiguous commissioner selection techniques
and/or other technical problems.

If no clear distinction

could be made on the manner in which regulators were placed
into office or if gaps appear in the data, the firms were
deleted from the study.
Costello's model consisted of 82 large electric
utilities in 43 states with firms in some states excluded
for the following reasons; Nebraska, because it had no
investor owned electric utilities; Tennessee, because it had
only one small electric utility subject to state regulation;
Virginia and South Carolina because their utility
commissioners are elected by the legislature which makes it
unclear whether they are elected or appointed.

The utility

firms from Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas were also
removed because they did not start regulating utilities
17
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until 1976, Costello argued that there would not have been
enough time for any new regulation to have much of an
effect.

Some utilities were excluded if they served more

than one state and operated under different types of
commission regimes.

Certain other utilities were not

selected by Costello because they had some data missing.
All the data for the study came from the Energy
Information Administration. U. S. Department of Energy.
Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the
United States. 1980 Annual.
1980 Data Analysis
Utilities have three types of customers: residential;
commercial; and industrial.

When Costello re-estimated the

Mann-Primeaux model, he found that the effect of commission
structure was not significant for any of the types of
customers, therefore, he included only the regression
results from residential customers.

Theoretically, if

consumers had more control over prices through electing
commissioners, the price difference between the two regimes
should show up under residential customers first.
1982)

(Navarro,

The elected commissioner seeks to keep residential

customers content by restricting prices to residential
customers and possibly making it up by raising prices to
other classes of customers to which the commissioner is less
vulnerable.

When re-estimating Costello's model in this

paper, only one customer classe was represented.

For the
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remainder of the paper, three customer classes are used.
To represent all three types of customer classes, three
regressions are used, one for each one of the dependent
variables.

All three equations are identical and linear in

form:
Pi = B0 + BX(SS) + B2(DC) + B3(TX) + B4(PC) + B5(COMM)
Where: Pi = price to the ith customer class.
BO = estimator for the Constant
SS = system scale estimator
DC = distribution costs estimator
TX = tax cost estimator
PC = production cost estimator
COMM = dummy estimator for the commission structure:
1 = appointed commissions and
0 = elected commissions
The expected signs are as described above in Chapter 2.
The (SS) variable is expected to have a negative sign.

As

the size of the plant gets larger, production efficiency
increases and prices are reduced.

DC, TX, and PC are all

expected to have positive signs, indicating a positive
influence on the price of electricity.
The commission variable may have either a positive or
negative sign.

A positive sign will show evidence for the

capture theory with the tendency for appointed commissions
to raise price to the customers more frequently than elected
commissions.

A negative sign would show evidence for the
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hostility theory as discussed previously.
The data were gathered and entered to Micro TSP (Time
Series Package) published by Quantitative Micro Systems
(Lilien, 1990).

Results from Costello and the new

estimations are given for comparison purposes.

If the two

sets of regressions are reasonably close in the coefficients
and t-statistics, the model and data can be assumed to have
been reproduced correctly.

Standard diagnostic tests showed

substantial heteroscedasticity, so the variables were
regressed using White's heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance method to obtain correct standard errors.

(See

Appendix A)
There is a modicum of difference between Costello's
estimation and the re-estimation of the data in table 2.
the variables that were significant in Costello's regression
are significant in the revised regression.

There is a

slight difference in the t-statistics between the two
regressions which may be due to the firms Costello excluded
from the model.

Costello's original list is not known so

the revised list of firms may not be identical.

The

differences between the results of the two papers are paltry
which suggests that the new estimation is a reasonable
facsimile of Costello's estimation.
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TABLE 2
1980 DATA
RESIDENTIAL PRICES
Variable

Costello

Constant

(*) b
(2.11)

SS

Hagen
a
0.025
(4.391)

-0.025
(-0.69)

DC
TX
PC
COMM

b
2.53
(2.14)
a
2.31
(7.76)
a
0.869
(11.08)

7.424E--10
(0.951)
b
5.448
(2.199)
a
4.794
(2.070)
a
0.751
(4.683)

-0.003
(-0.27)

0.27
(0.789)

R Squared

=

0.84

R squared

0.46

Adj. R Sq

=

0.84

Adj. R Sq

0.43

F statistic = 80.8

F statistic

13.16

N

N

82

T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
K

Significance at p= .01 using a one-tailed test.
Significance at p= .05 using a one-tailed test.
Significance at

II
H
O

Note :

=82

using a one-tailed test.

(*) Costello did not give a point estimate in his
empirical results.
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1992 Data
The same criteria is used to obtain the data for 1992
as was used in the 1980 Costello study.

The data for 1992

came from the Energy Information Administration. U. S .
Department of Energy. Financial Statistics of Manor
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities. 1992 Annual.

Some firms

were bought and/or changed their names while others seemed
to drop from the list for unknown reasons.

For example,

Kansas Power and Light changed its name to "Western
Resources" while Appalachian Power dropped from the list for
unknown reasons (Moody's, 1992).

Firms that changed their

names were retained but some of the firms that dropped out
could not be traced, therefore had to be dropped from the
list, resulting in 78 firms for the 1992 sample.

Appendix C

contains the list of firms included in the sample.
In addition to estimating the model with the 1992 data,
the model was also estimated as a pooled time series.

The

test to determine the validity of the pooling is presented
in Appendix A.
Testing the Hypothesis
The t-statistics and coefficients for Costello's
original model have been re-estimated for the 1980 and 1992
data along with the pooled data.

All pertinent statistical

results are listed in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

Table 3 lists the

residential customer results for the three data sets with
Table 4 the commercial and Table 5 the industrial results.
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TABLE 3

ESTIMATED REGRESSIONS OF THE MODEL FOR RESIDENTIAL PRICES
Variable

1980 Data

1992 Data

Constant

0.025
(4.391)

0.020
(3.629)

SS

7.424E-10
(0.951)
b
5.448
(2.199)
b
4.794
(2.070)
a
0.751
(4.683)

1.532E-09
(3.753)
a
3.548
(2.519)
a
2.076
(6.658)
a
0.764
(9.481)
C
0.005
(1.568)

1.286E-09
(3.358)
a
3.737
(2.989)
a
1.838
(7.327)
a
0.737
(9.905)
b
0.004
(1.845)

0.722

0.777

Pooled Data
0.025
(7.716)
a

DC
TX
PC
COMM

0.270
(0.789)

Adjusted
R Squared

0.428

a

F Statistic

13.16

41.029

111.729

N

82

78

160

Note:

T-statistics are shown in parentheses,
a
Significant at p = .01 using a one-tailed test,
b
Significant at p=.05 using a one-tailed test,
c

Significant at p=.10 using a one-tailed test.
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The residential regression estimations are
significantly different for the 1992 data than for the 1980
data.

For example; the t-statistic for the system scale

variable is now significant at the 1% level with one
difference, the result is a positive coefficient rather than
the negative expected coefficient.

This would suggest that

the price rises as the size of the plant gets larger.
One possible, but cynical, explanation, for rising
prices with larger plants, may be that the larger firms have
more political power and therefore have more influence in
determining their price (Barvick, 1983).

The power comes in

the form of money to send representatives to the commissions
to lobby on behalf of the utility firms.

The more time the

analysts from the utility companies can spend explaining
their views to the commissioners, the better chance they
have in gaining price increases when requested.
Another possible explanation for higher prices with
larger systems may be that they no longer hold scale
advantages as they once did.

Through the 1970s and 1980s,

technological advances have mitigated the price advantages
of the large generating capacities to the point to where
smaller generating capacities are as efficient as many of
the old larger plants (Dalglish, 1995).

The reaction of the

system scale variable may be a reflection of the new
economies of scale within the industry.

25

A third supposition to keep in mind regarding the
result in the system scale variable is the fact that the
coefficient is very small.

The extremely small coefficient

suggests that all the customer classes are well into the
minimum efficient size of the long-run average cost curve.
With the minute coefficient in mind, the fact that the sign
is positive or negative may have less meaning to it than if
the coefficient was larger (O'Neill, 1997).
The DC, TX, and PC variables are significant as
expected for all three data sets.

All three exhibited the

positive sign as expected, indicating rising prices with
higher costs.
The t-statistic for the dummy variable becomes
significant at the 10% level for the residential regressions
in the 1992 data and the 5% level in the pooled regression.
The positive sign is indicative of rising prices with
appointed commissions, lending credence to the capture
theory of regulation.
The R-squared numbers have increased in the 1992
regression over the 1980 regressions.

This result indicates

that more of the price variance is explained by the
regressors in the model (Greene, 1993).

The fact that

system scale and the commission variable have become
significant in the 1992 model accounts for this change.

The

R-Squareds attributable to SS and Comm both increase in the
1992 data.
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TABLE 4

ESTIMATED REGRESSIONS OF THE MODEL FOR COMMERCIAL PRICES
Variable

1980 Data

1992 Data

Constant

0.028
(5.445)

0.022
(4.001)

SS

6.032E-10
(1.088)
c
2.752
(1.457)
c
2.872
(1.334)
a
0.854
(4.918)

1 .294E-09
(2.901)

Pooled Data
0.029
(0.313)
a

DC
TX
PC
COMM

4.730E-05
(0.014)

Adjusted
R Squared

0.401

1.779
(1.168)
a
1.872
(5.697)
a
0.813
(9.159)
-0.002
(-0.732)
0.676

a
1.125E-09
(3.078)
c
1.890
(1.663)
a
1.356
(5.935)
a
0.776
(8.646)
0.001
(-0.217)
0.696

F Statistic

11.866

33.08

73.897

N

82

78

160

Note:

T-statistics are shown in parentheses,
a
Significant at p = .01 using a one-tailed test,
b
Significant at p=.05 using a one-tailed test,
c

Significant at p=.10 using a one-tailed test.
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For the commercial regressions, the system scale
variable becomes statistically significant in the 1992 and
pooled regressions which, as argued previously, may mean
very little because of the small coefficients.
For the 1992 data, the DC variable falls slightly short
of the 10% significance level for the commercial regression.
Because the t-statistic is close, there may not be much
significance to this outcome.

Both of the TX and PC

variables are significant as expected.

The sign is positive

meaning rising prices with rises in input costs.
The commission variable is not significant in any of
the equations.

Thus the results are not supportive of

either the capture or hostility hypotheses.
The estimated regressions for the industrial prices are
given in Table 5.
For the industrial regressions and all the data sets,
the SS variable has a positive sign indicating rising prices
with larger plants.

As stated previously, this may mean

very little because of the small coefficient.
The industrial DC, TX, and PC variables all have the
expected positive sign indicating rising prices with higher
costs.
The commission variable becomes significant in the 1992
and the pooled data.
capture theory.

This result lends credibility to the
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TABLE 5

ESTIMATED REGRESSIONS OF THE MODEL FOR INDUSTRIAL PRICES
Variable

1980 Data

Constant

0.009
(1.897)

SS

9.854E-10
(1.822)
b
5.142
(2.191)
c
3.808
(1.462)
a
0.835
(5.068)

1992 Data
-0.001
(-0.303)
b

DC
TX
PC
COMM

0.0002
(0.074)

Adjusted
R Squared

Pooled Data
0.010
(3.451)
a

8.112E-10
(3.563)
a
3.602
(3.286)
a
1.458
(6.113)
a
0.743
(10.650)
c
0.003
(1.542)

a
8.314E-10
(3.240)
a
3.845
(2.914)
a
0.668
(2.726)
a
0.704
(8.558)
c
0.002
(1.291)

0.513

0.780

0.689

F Statistic

18.103

55.762

71.615

N

82

78

160

Note:

T-statistics are shown in parentheses,
a
Significant at p=.01 using a one-tailed test,
b
Significant at p=.05 using a one-tailed test,
c

Significant at p=.10 using a one-tailed test.
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Costello asserted that the results were not
substantially different between the residential and
industrial/comraercial regressions from his 1980 data set.
This re-estimation from the 1980 data verifies this
statement.
The R-squared numbers have increased in the 1992
regression over the 1980 regressions.

This result indicates

that more of the price variation is explained by the
regressors in the model.

The fact that system scale and the

commission variable have become significant in the 1992
model may account for this change (Greene, 1993).
The estimation results show that the type of commission
does have a significant effect on the price of electricity,
unlike Costello's research results (Costello, 1984).

There

are many regulatory changes happening in the electric
industry and the commissions are impacting those changes
(Flippen, 1997).

Those changes may impact consumers in a

positive or negative manner depending on who has the
political power to affect how the commissions price
electricity in the future (Schuler, 1997).

Some

commissioners assert that the big money in the industry will
determine how the regulation changes and it will change in
favor of the electric firms (Schuler, 1997).

This paper has

provided evidence that capture is still evident in the
electric industry and provides a rationale for further
research on the topic.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION
The electric industry has gone through tumultuous
changes since 1973.

Extremely rapid increases in costs

during the 1970s put many regulated utilities at risk
through loss of profits and threat of corporate takeover.
Prior to the 1970s there was little for the regulator to do
regarding electric utilities.

Prices were going down

because of rapid increases in technologies which made the
regulators look as if they were doing their jobs very well.
With the price increases of the 1970s, the regulator's
job became much more difficult.

The electric utilities were

filing for rate relief more often and the regulator had to
determine whether the increases were justified.

With

inflation rising, determining the necessity of the price
increases was obvious through increasing input costs, but
the amount of those increases were very hard to resolve.
During inflationary times, some prices rise faster than
others, increasing regulator's tasks (Colander, 1995).
The regulators were thrust into a much more visible
role and consequently came under much greater public
scrutiny.

Consumers were increasingly concerned with the

increases in their electric rates and began to demand
30
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action.

Many states, such as Nebraska, who had not

regulated electric utilities prior to this, began to develop
regulatory commissions to serve the public interest.

Other

states that already had public service commissions, began to
look into changing those commissions from appointed to
elected (Harris and Navarro, 1983).

At the time, economic

theory suggested that elected commissions would have a
tendency to hold prices lower to residential customers which
led to many referendums to change the commission structure.
Very few states changed their structure, but by 1980, all
states had public service commissions (O'Connor, 1997).
Studies done during the early 1970s showed evidence for
the capture theory but by 1980, the evidence dried up in
favor of other theories relating to costs of capital (Dubin
and Navarro, 1983).

Many economists, including Trout and

Navarro, began to suggest that rising prices were related to
the negative effect of bond ratings associated with
utilities under elected regulatory commissions.

Trout said

there may be hostility that elected commissions have toward
regulated utilities.
The central theme in this thesis is to test the capture
and hostility hypotheses.

The regressions reported in this

paper support two main conclusions.

First, regressions

performed on the 1980 data do not support either of the
hypotheses but the regressions performed on the 1992 and
pooled data support the capture hypothesis.

Tables 3 and 5
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in Chapter 3 clearly show significant t-statistics on the
commission variable with respect to the 1992 data, however,
the 1980 data results are inconclusive.

Second, the pooled

regressions indicate some reasons for the difference in the
results between the data sets.
In Chapter 3, the data were pooled and run as a pooled
cross section and time series model.

(Appendix A contains

the econometric information behind the pooling of the data.)
The pooled regressions are useful in the sense that they can
be used to test for fundamental differences in the industry
between the two time periods.

If there is very little

difference between the F-statistics, then the data from one
period can be pooled with the data from the other.

When

they can be pooled, it means there is no substantial
difference in the industry from the two periods.

Therefore,

the change in the statistics from the 1980 data to the 1992
data shows some outside force exerting influence on the
industry and not just the industry going through changes.
In short, the model may have shown higher t-statistics with
1992 data than the 1980 data because of more stable
macroeconomic policies.
This paper provides evidence that the macroeconomic
policies of the 1970s had a profound effect on the electric
industry.

Inflation problems causes microeconomic

inefficiencies which lead to noise in the data.

Noise in

the data brings about heteroscedasticity problems and

33

estimations that are incorrect (Blackwell, 1998).
There are four main pieces of evidence in this paper to
support the above claims.

First, the R-squareds increase in

the equation estimations from 1980 to 1992.

Increased R-

squared results indicate the variables in the model explain
a larger share of the change in price in 1992 than in 1980.
A second indication of strong inflationary influence is the
heteroskedasticity problem which seemed to be worse in the
1980 data than it was in the 1992 data.

Appendix E contains

scatter plots of the residuals which appear to show stronger
heteroscedasticity in the 1980 residuals than in the 1992
residuals.

The T-statistics were improved in the 1992 data

which shows a stronger relationship between inputs and the
prices charged by the electric firms.

A stronger

relationship suggests a more efficient input combination.
Lastly, the pooled time series gives evidence that the
industry did not change over time which suggests that
changes listed above were caused by forces outside of the
industry.

In the time period relevant to this study,

inflation was the major outside influence on the industry.
Inflation is now under control and data obtained from the
industry should be free of noise problems caused by
inflation.
More work needs to be done on the deeper issue of the
exact relationship between the regulatory commissions and
the firms that they regulate.

With changes happening in the
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industry there are many analysts that attribute much
importance to how the commissions structure the new lesser
regulated environment.

Some analysts such as Cross (1998),

see the market as more open, but under very controlled
conditions.

Under a controlled scenario, the market may as

well be under full regulation, so, in the end, what is the
difference?

Other analysts such as Rose (1997) see even

higher prices coming for consumers because of inherent
problems with electric consumption.
full discussion of these issues.)

(See Appendix B for a
If capture is still a

problem, then capture is still possible under this new
regulated environment.
This study appears to give support to the capture
theory which states that the commissions are captured by the
firms they regulate.

Do they capture them as Barvick (1983)

suggests, by attending meetings and spending alot of time in
discussions with the regulators?

Do the firms capture the

regulators by the promise of a well paying job when they
leave their commission post as suggested by Barvick (1983) .
The nature of capture was never fully resolved by past
studies and should be researched again.

If regulatory

commissions are captured by the firms, this issue should be
resolved through much more academic research.

This would

allow us to develop an understanding of how they are
captured and devise ways to offset the wealth maximizing
effect of the electric utility against the consumer.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
ECONOMETRIC TESTS
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It is important to check the validity of the model by
a number of tests.

The regressions were originally run with

the application of simple OLS. On further examination, it
appeared that most of the assumptions that must be applied
to OLS, for the best estimators possible, were met (Cassidy,
1981).

The regression model is linear in the parameters and

the error term had a zero population mean.

The residuals

were run with OLS against the other regressors and there was
no correlation between them.

The error term, however, did

not appear to be homoscedastic.

The residuals were plotted

against the regressors and obvious heteroscedasticity
appeared in the graphs.

(See Appendix E for a listing of the

graphs)
Test(k) is used in TSP to test for heteroscedasticity
in the residuals (Lilien, 1990).

This output gave the

appearance of at least some colinearity in the model, which
means there must be some regressors that are explaining the
same thing (Webster, 1992).

A number of statistical

corrections were tried to get the colinearity out of the
model so that the test for heteroscedasticity could be
affirmed directly with TSP's test(k). The two most
significant regressors were used to run the White test.

The

regressors used were, distribution costs (DC) and production
costs (PC).

The residuals were first squared and then used

as the dependent variable in the White regression.
regression that was tested looked like this:

The
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LS PI C DC PC
Where LS = least squares,
PI = the dependent variable,
C = the constant variable,
DC = an independent variable,
PC = an independent variable.
The White regression has this makeup:
LS ERSQ C DC PC (DC*DC)

(Lilien, 1990)

(PC*PC) DC*PC

Once this White regression is run, the R-Squared is
multiplied by the N of the model to get the F-Statistic for
the model (Blackwell, April 23, 1996).

The output for the

White regression is listed in the table below:
TABLE 6
RESIDUAL TEST
Variable

Coefficients

Constant
DC
PC
DCSQ
PCSQ
DCPC
R Squared
Adj. R Sq
F statistic
N

0 .000
-0 .071
-0 .021
-74 .712
-0 .072
14 .675

T-Ratios
2 .063
-0..676
- 1 ..678
- 1 .685
-0 .301
2 .473

= 0.17
= 0.11
= 13.97
=82

The F-Statistic from the table for the 95% confidence
interval is 11.07, so the null is rejected and the fact of
heteroscedasticity is affirmed.
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Now that heteroscedasticity is affirmed, what is the
best estimation that can be obtained from this set of
regressors?

White's heteroscedastic-consistent least

squares was used to arrive at the best possible estimate for
this thesis model.

In normal least squares regressions, the

variance of the error is taken out and assumed to be
constant.

The problem that arises from this is that the

error variance that may exist because of heteroscedasticity
is not taken into account.

When the error variance is not

taken into account, the estimated variances of each of the
estimated parameters will be biased.

Biased estimators lead

to statistical tests and confidence intervals that are
incorrect (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).
The best way to repair the heteroscedasticity problem
was to use the White heteroscedastic-consistent least
squares formula to estimate the equations (Lilien, 1990).
That is done in TSP with the LS(h) option for least squares.
All of the applicable regressions in this thesis paper have
been run using this method of estimation.

Although this

regression method is better, it is still not efficient, but
it was the best estimate that could be obtained with this
particular set of data.
Pooled Time Series
Under the guidance of Dr. Blackwell (1996), the model
was run as a pooled time series to test whether series were
similar or whether the series between the two years
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underwent any substantial changes.

The test for the

validity of the pooled data is to calculate the F-statistic
from the data as it is regressed separately and then pooled
into one large data set.

The formula for the calculation is

the following:
Fk2,nl +n2 - 2k = (SSEc - SSEa - SSEb) /k
(SSEa + SSEb)/ (nl + n2 - 2k)
Where k = independent variables in the data sets,
n = number of observations in each data set,
SSE = sum of squared errors in each data set,
a = data set number one (1980 data set),
b = data set number 2 (1992 data set) and
c = the pooled regression.
After regressing the original model, using residential
prices, with the 1980 and 1992 data sets, then pooling the
data and running the pooled regression, the numbers were
entered in the above formula.
1.28823.

The answer was an (F) of

(Shown below)

Fk, nl + n2 - 2k =

(.022204 - .009406 - .011884)75
(.009406 + .011874)/(82 + 78 - 2(5))
F = 1.28823

This low (F) value means that the data from the two
periods can be pooled.

When the data sets can be pooled,

the results of the regression have more validity through a
larger data set. The larger data set may give a clearer
picture of the importance of the relationship of the data
over time.

The fact that the data can be pooled also means

that the series have not changed over time.

APPENDIX B
DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION
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The wave of deregulation moving through industries in
the 1970s and 1980s has now hit the electric industry.
Success in deregulating communications and transportation
industries and the fact of technological advances, has now
made it theoretically possible to deregulate the utility
sector as well.

California was the first state to introduce

the idea of a deregulated environment in the electric
industry by preparing what they called a blue book,
containing a blueprint for deregulation.
On April 20, 1994, the California Public Utilities
Commission unveiled its "Blue Book", aiming to make its
electric services industry more competitive.

California's

PUC envisioned a P00LC0 much like Great Britain's where the
price of electricity is equal to the last bidder in the
pool, the bidder with the lower price offers its electric
services to providers first and the rest follow (Rodgers and
Schuler, 1998) .

Top executives and other industry analysts

were skeptical about the POOLCO idea because of the
strategic gaming involved with Great Britain's POOLCO and
pushed for other methods such as bilateral trading.
Bilateral trading is where the buyers and sellers of
electricity deal directly with each other possibly reducing
the threat of anti-competitive gaming.
On March 31, 1998 California's competitive market
became a reality and actually consisted of a mixture of
POOLCO ideas and bilateral trading (Soyka, 1998).

The
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Independent System Operator (ISO) was developed as the
manager of the transmission grid and the Power Exchange (PX)
is the price setting arm of the new system.

As of March 31,

1998, the power exchange is allowing selling on the spot
market on a day-ahead schedule.

It is anticipated that it

will be selling on the hour ahead schedule (Rodgers and
Schuler, 1998).

As of November 1998, Energy Service

Providers (ESPs) are developing as separate companies and
are doing the work of the PXs. The ESPs are spinning off
many different kinds of energy service products for
customers, including aggregating energy loads through
metering and energy quality management (Schuler, 1998).
Energy contracts of one to five years and general price
savings of two to five percent are common in the California
power market (Wiser, Golove, and Pickle, 1998) . At first
glance this appears to be the beginning of nirvana in the
electric industry but there are already problems developing.
Many analysts believed wholesale prices would be near
variable costs for the cheapest plants under a more dynamic
free-enterprise led electric industry, however, in the
summer of 1997,prices soared higher than the variable costs
of even the highest priced production (Rose, 1997).

In

regulated markets, there were mandated excess reserves which
allowed prices to be very stable even in peak load times of
the year, but in deregulated markets the price of
electricity will determine new load requirements.

The
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market will tend to want to balance loads to megawatts in
usage, average usage, which means that reserve capacity will
disappear, causing spot market prices that are very high
during peak loads.

A deregulated market will want to use

price to balance out the peaks and make electricity usage
more stable (Rose, 1997).

In the summer of 1998, many

companies were stung by high spot prices at peak load times
but nobody seems to know for sure just who is picking up the
tab for the extra costs during peak usage times.

Very

little data has surfaced regarding peak power pricing but
more should be known by early 1999 (Seiple, Pearson, and
Wagman, 1998).
Given the above reasoning, how can an unregulated
market serve demand that is inherently unstable?

Those who

are accustomed to electricity on demand may balk at having
to shut off usage at peak load times and call for at least
some re-regulation to solve the problem (Cross, 1998).
Another problem is huge write-off costs that will be
handed to consumers under the guise of stranded cost
recovery.

Right now there are a handful of states that are

experimenting with customer choice in the electric industry.
Most of these states, including California, are allowing
stranded cost recovery to be written into the legislation.
Stranded costs are the value of generation assets that are
below the book value because of high production costs.
These high production costs are considered to be uneconomic
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costs and will represent accelerated write offs in the form
of added bills on the distribution network.

Any company

that can demonstrate below book values and has distribution
assets will be allowed to add those costs on the lease of
their distribution network.

Total stranded costs in the

industry are estimated to be between $100 billion and $550
billion and will likely represent higher bills to customers
for the first years under deregulation (Flippen, 1997).
Consumers may respond negatively to this result and demand
that commissions look into the problem.

According to James

Malachowski, chairman, Rhode Island Public Utilities
Commission, "The amount of money at stake is tremendous, and
I think the only way commissions are going to be allowed to
set policy will be based on the extent to which they rule in
favor of those (large electric firms) powerful forces."
(Schuler, 1996)

This problem alone will significantly

increase the role the commission takes in regulation and the
ultimate cost of electricity to consumers (Flippen, 1997).
With the high spot prices due to unregulated markets
and temporarily higher prices due to stranded cost recovery,
the role commissions play in the electricity market will be
substantial for the foreseeable future (Wood, 1996) . This
continued role of the commissions lends credibility to the
claim that the commissions should be studied further to
determine just how commissions affect market structure and
pricing.

APPENDIX C
LIST OF FIRMS USED IN THIS STUDY.

46

47

List of Firms and States in the StudyState____________Utility Firm___________Commission Type
E - Elected
* Denotes Firms Excluded From 1992
A -Appointed
Alabama
Arizona
n

*

II

Arkansas
California
II
II

Colorado
Connecticut
H
*
II

Florida
ii
ii
ii

Georgia
II

Illinois
II
II
II

Indiana
II
II
II

Iowa
Kansas
II

Kentucky
II
II

Louisiana
H

*

II
II

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
ii

Michigan
II

Mississippi
II

Alabama Power Co.
Arizona Public Service
Citizens Utility Co.
Tucson Electric Co.
Arkansas Power & Light
Pacific Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison
Public Service Co. of CO
Connecticut Power & Light
Hartford Electric Light
United Aluminating Co.
Florida Power Corp.
Florida Power & Light
Gulf Power Co.
Tampa Electric Co.
Georgia Power Co.
Savannah Electric Co.
Central Illinois Light Co.
Central Illinois Public Svc.
Commonwealth Edison
Illinois Power
Indiana & Michigan El. Co.
Indianapolis Power & Light
Northern Indiana Public Svc
Public Service Co. of Indiana
Iowa Power and Light
Kansas Gas & Electric
Kansas Power & Light
Kentucky Power Co.
Kentucky Utilities Co.
Louisville Gas & Electric
Central Louisiana Electric
Gulf States Utilities
Louisiana Power & Light
New Orleans Public Service
Central Maine Power Co.
Baltimore Gas & Electric
Boston Edison
Massachusetts Electric Co.
Consumers Power Co.
Detroit Edison
Mississippi Power Co.
Mississippi Pwr & Light

E
E
E
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
E
E
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
E
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State____________ Utility Firm___________ Commission Type
Missouri
II

Montana
Nevada
II

New Hampshire
New Jersey
II

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
II
II
II
II
II

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
II
II
II
II
II

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
II
II
II
II
II

Rhode Island
Utah
West Virginia *
II

Wisconsin
II

Kansas City Power & Light
Union Electric Co.
Montana Power Co.
Nevada Power
Sierra Pacific Power
Public Service Co.
Atlantic City Electric
Jersey Central Power
Public Service Electric
Public Service Co. of NM
Central Hudson Gas & El.
Consolidated Edison
Long Island Lighting
New York State El. & Gas
Orange and Rockland
Rochester Gas & Electric
Carolina Power & Light
MDU Resources Group
Cleveland Electric 111. Co.
Columbus & Southern Ohio
Dayton Power & Light
Ohio Edison
Ohio Power Co.
Toledo Edison
Public Service Co. of OK
Portland General Electric
Duquesne Light
Metropolitan Edison
Pennsylvania Electric Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Philadelphia Electric Co.
West Penn Power Co.
Narragansett Electric
Utah Power & Light
Appalachian Power
Monongahela Power Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power
Wisconsin Public Svc. Corp.

A
A
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

APPENDIX D
GRAPH OF PRICES BETWEEN VARIOUS CUSTOMER CLASSES.
1980 and 1992
PI = Residential Prices
P2 = Commercial Prices
P3 = Industrial Prices
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APPENDIX E
GRAPHS OF RESIDUALS SHOWING HETEROSCEDASTICITY.
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The assertion that heteroscedasticity is worse in the
1980 data than the 1992 data can be illustrated through the
residuals for the PC variable.

For the 1980 data, the

residuals get further apart as production costs get larger.
For the 1992 data the residuals appear to get smaller as
production gets larger.

According to Hanke and Reitsch

(1991), changes that alter the underlying structure of the
economy can cause heteroscedasticity.

The most important

change happening in the economy during this time period was
unexpected inflation, therefore, heteroscedasticity became a
problem as a result of underlying economic problems in the
economy.
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) , when
heterscedasticity is present, the OLS estimation places more
weight on the observations with higher variances.

With

heteroscedasticity the parameter estimators are not
efficient, so the variances of the estimated parameters are
not the minimum variances.

As explained in Appendix A,

White's heteroscedastic-consistent least squares was used to
arrive at the most efficient estimators possible.

The

problem that arises is that the 1980 data and regressions
will still be inefficient to some degree while the 1992 data
and corresponding regressions will be much more efficient.
The proof, therefore, is in the pudding, the 1980 estimators
have much less efficiency and show lower t-statistics than
the 1992 regressions and corresponding estimators.

1980 COMM Model Residuals
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1992 COMM Model Residuals
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